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Abstract
Background: A persistent feature of international health policy debate is whether a single-payer or multiple-payer
system can offer superior performance. In Ireland, a major reform proposal is the introduction of ‘managed
competition’ based on the recent reforms in the Netherlands, which would replace many functions of Ireland’s public
payer with a system of competing health insurers from 2016. This article debates whether Ireland meets the
preconditions for effective managed competition, and whether the government should implement the reform
according to its stated timeline. We support our arguments by discussing the functioning of the Dutch and Irish
systems.
Discussion: Although Ireland currently lacks key preconditions for effective implementation, the Dutch experience
demonstrates that some of these can be implemented over time, such as a more rigorous risk equalization system. A
fundamental problem may be Ireland’s sparse hospital distribution. This may increase the market power of hospitals
and weaken insurers’ ability to exclude inefficient or poor quality hospitals from contracts, leading to unwarranted
spending growth. To mitigate this, the government proposes to introduce a system of price caps for hospital services.
The Dutch system of competition is still in transition and it is premature to judge its success. The new system may
have catalyzed increased transparency regarding clinical performance, but outcome measurement remains crude. A
multi-payer environment creates some disincentives for quality improvement, one of which is free-riding by insurers
on their rivals’ quality investments. If a Dutch insurer invests in improving hospital quality, hospitals will probably offer
equivalent quality to consumers enrolled with other insurance companies. This enhances equity, but may weaken
incentives for improvement. Consequently the Irish government, rather than insurers, may need to assume
responsibility for investing in clinical quality. Plans are in place to assure consumers of free choice of insurer, but a key
concern is a potential shortfall of institutional capacity to regulate managed competition.
Summary: Managed competition requires a long transition period and the requisite preconditions are not yet in
place. The Irish government should refrain from introducing managed competition until sufficient preconditions are
in place to allow effective performance.
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Background: The Irish and Dutch health systems
Ireland’s general election of 2011 signified a major change
in the political landscape. After spending only four of
the preceding fifteen years in government, the Fine Gael
political party assumed power as the dominant partner
in a coalition with over two thirds of parliamentary seats
[1]. This electoral mandate gave impetus to Fine Gael’s
proposed introduction of ‘managed competition’ between
insurance companies, a universal health insurance model
based on key features of the Dutch system [2,3].
Government policy documents set out a three phase
plan for reform. The first phase aimed to abolish out-of-
pocket payments for primary care for all citizens, however
efforts to date have been unsuccessful. The second phase
is the introduction of activity-based payment for hospi-
tals, in order to enhance efficiency and alleviate waiting
lists, and this is currently underway. The final and most
far-reaching phase is the introduction of managed compe-
tition, scheduled for the 2016 to 2019 period. This paper
debates whether the preconditions for effective managed
competition are in place in Ireland. If key preconditions
are absent there is a case for the government refraining
from this reform or from its stated timeline. Competition
between payers is proposed also for England [4] and China
[5], therefore this debate is relevant for policy makers in
many settings.
This section describes key features of the Irish and
Dutch health systems and the rationale for the proposed
reform. In Ireland, most health financing derives from
statutory resources and flows through a public purchaser
and provider, the Health Service Executive (HSE). As a
public monopoly, the HSE is not exposed to competi-
tion. The proportion of the population enrolled in private
health insurance decreased from 48% to 43%, between
2007 and 2012 [6]. Spending on private health insurance
amounted to around 13% of health spending in 2010 [7,8].
Around 10 - 15% of health spending is from out-of-pocket
payments. This institutional landscape would be reshaped
by managed competition, where insurers would assume
most responsibility for financing and purchasing.
The Irish government cites multiple reasons for emu-
lating a ‘Dutch’ model. One reason is equity, as around
half of the population is enrolled in supplementary insur-
ance schemes, which currently entitles them to faster
access to some essential hospital services [9]. Official pol-
icy documents describe the Irish system as “unfair” and
“two-tier” [2]. Fine Gael argues also that the Dutch model
can alleviate “inefficient” service provision. Clinical qual-
ity improvement receives less explicit policy attention, but
is a key health system goal [10].
A tenet of the Dutch model of managed competition is
consumer choice of purchaser. Consumers may switch to
a rival insurer to seek better price of insurance, service,
or value of the underlying provider network. Since market
failures plague the health care sector [11], regulation
counteracts some of the perverse incentives of traditional
health insurance markets. The aim of this model is to
align the commercial interests of insurers with consumers’
health and financial wellbeing, whereby insurers can pros-
per by prudently purchasing health care for consumers
[12,13]. A detailed history of multiple and single payer
models is beyond the scope of this paper. The organiza-
tional structure of managed competition is depicted in
Figure 1.
Key features of the Dutch system include mandatory
insurance for all citizens, a standardized benefits pack-
age, risk equalization, and competition between insur-
ers to attract consumers. The government defines the
benefits package to prevent risk selection and encour-
age competition on price and quality, rather than on
benefit design and market segmentation [14]. Benefits
include practically all primary medical care and hospital
care, but exclude dental and nursing home carea. Sup-
plementary insurance policies including dental and cos-
metic care are optionally available. Each insurer’s revenues
comprise an annual community-rated premium paid by
enrollees, combined with a weighted payment from a
risk-equalization fund to reflect individual patients’ risk
profile. This dampens incentives to preferentially enroll
low-risk patients with predictably lower health care
expenses. The system involves virtually no co-payments,
a mandatory deductible of € 350 Eurob and an optional
deductible (between € 0 and € 500)c.
The successful implementation of managed competi-
tion depends on a number of preconditions [4]. More-
over, as health systems are a product of country-specific
institutional, cultural and socio-demographic factors, an
effective model in one setting may be inappropriate else-
where. Therefore it is important to debate the prepared-
ness of the Irish healthcare system for the introduction
of managed competition. This debate mostly concerns
the Dutch model and its lessons for Ireland, but we
also seek to draw generalizable lessons for other systems.
The debate describes successes and failures of the model
in the Netherlands, and considers whether the insurer,
provider market, and regulatory institution context in
Ireland would lead to comparable outcomes.
While this is not a systematic review, we draw on a
review of international experience of market competition
in healthcare conducted by Gaynor and Town [15]. In
addition, in some instances there is limited data on the
experience of insurer competition in the Netherlands, and
it is appropriate to refer to the experience of the United
States, due to its significant experience in regulation of
health insurance markets. However, for the most part the
debate draws solely on experiences of the Netherlands and
Ireland, as findings from other settings are likely to have
limited generalizability.
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Figure 1 The idea behindmanaged competition.
A number of conceptual frameworks are potentially
applicable to this debate. Glied [16] specifies three mar-
ket failures any system must address (industry competi-
tiveness, asymmetric information about health risks and
moral hazard and information about health care quality).
Okma and Crivelli [17] argue that managed competition
should fulfill four assumptions, such as the desire of con-
sumers to actively “shop around” for high value insurance
plans [17]. For this debate we adopt the more specific
framework of Bevan and van de Ven [4]. Their frame-






5. freedom to contract
6. consumer choice of insurer
7. financial incentives for efficiency
8. sufficient providers and insurers
We shall discuss these items in a slightly different order.
The focus of section “Freedom to contract” is the free-
dom of insurers to contract with providers, and section
“Sufficient providers and insurers” deals with the
sufficiency of provider and insurer supply. Section
“Consumer choice of insurer” addresses consumer choice
of insurer, and section “Financial incentives for effi-
ciency” deals with financial incentives for efficiency.
Sections “Risk equalization”, ‘Transparency and consumer
information’, and “Market regulation” deal with risk
equalization, the implications of transparency for clinical
quality, and institutions formarket regulation respectively.
Each section ends by summarizing the fulfillment of these
preconditions. A concluding section draws some general
inferences from this debate.
Discussion
Freedom to contract
The idea behind managed competition is that insurers
negotiate with providers on behalf of consumers. Insurers
should be free to engage in selective contracting (where
they exclude inefficient or poor quality providers from
contracts) and to negotiate all contract dimensions (e.g.
price, quality and volume). Bevan and van de Ven [4]
mention that prices in the Dutch hospital sector were
liberalized gradually from 10% of hospital production in
2006 to over 30% in 2009. After their article was pub-
lished, in 2012, the liberalized part was extended to all
elective care (roughly 70% of hospital production). Fur-
thermore, in some other sectors such as physiotherapy
and pharmacy, prices are liberalized. In other sectors (e.g.
speech therapy) maximum tariffs apply, but competition
is fierce and prices are below maximum tariffs [18]. In
section ‘The hospital market’ we shall further elaborate on
the experience with selective contracting in the hospital
market.
In Ireland the freedom to contract will be limited by
government regulation, although the details of this are
unclear. The claims expenses of insurers will be subject to
a cap, whichmay potentially result in rationing of care and
increase the importance of supplementary insurance. The
expenditure cap would be based on an insurer’s risk pro-
file and would consider switching between insurers and
the rate of healthcare price inflation. The government also
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proposes to introduce a price cap for individual services,
meaning that insurers could negotiate a price below this
but could not exceed it.
The propensity for selective contracting in the reformed
Irish system is unclear. Under the current system of sup-
plementary insurance, insurers are free to contract selec-
tively [19], and one hospital in an urban area was forced
into closure after a major insurer excluded it from its
contracts due to alleged high prices. Despite political
pressure for State financial support for the hospital, the
government did not intervene. Therefore there is prece-
dent for selective contracting in Ireland, but the extent to
which this will be permitted under managed competition
is unclear [20].
The extent of selective contracting would be influenced
by the Irish regulatory framework, and as we discuss in
Section ‘Market regulation’, the institutional framework
for regulation of managed competition is in an early stage
of development. Cultural factors may also influence the
likelihood of selective contracting, such as the willingness
of patients to travel to access hospital services and the
degree of trust in the motives of insurance companies. An
analysis of potentially relevant cultural factors is beyond
the scope of this debate.
In the Netherlands, insurers’ freedom to contract has
increased gradually, and selective contracting is permit-
tedd. In some sectors maximum tariffs apply. But since
hospital cost is the largest component of healthcare cost,
we tend to conclude that this condition is fulfilled in the
Netherlands. The propensity for selective contracting in
Ireland under managed competition is not yet clear. If
the freedom of insurers to contract selectively is ham-
pered, this will obstruct another of our preconditions:
incentives for efficiency (Section ‘Financial incentives for
efficiency’), illustrating the interlinked nature of some pre-
conditions. Freedom to contract will not be achieved in
Ireland because of the presence of price caps. But in light
of the peculiar market structure of Irish hospitals, the
adoption of price caps for hospital services may be an
appropriate lever to achieve efficiency, as we describe in
the following section.
Sufficient providers and insurers
A health system consists of multiple interlinked markets.
Even if managed competition achieves exceptional com-
petition in the market for insurance, insurers must be
powerful enough to extract value from the provider mar-
ket. This section first describes the competitiveness of
health insurance markets in the Netherlands and Ireland,
and explores the implications for efficiency and quality.
It then explores the influence of hospital market struc-
ture on insurers’ ability to prudently purchase care, and
the consequences for fulfillment of this precondition in
Ireland.
The insurancemarket
The degree of competition between insurers influences
their performance, although not in a uniform manner.
Four private health insurers operate in Ireland, offering
coverage for supplementary and some complementary
services (such as dental and travel insurance) to almost
50% of the population. The largest insurer, VHI, had 60%
market share as of July 2011, followed by Quinn Health-
care (now Laya Healthcare) and Aviva Health at 22% and
17.8% respectively, with restricted membership undertak-
ings accounting for the remaining insured population (e.g.
related to employment) (HIA 2011). The VHI operated as
a state supported monopoly from 1957 until the entry of
a rival (BUPA) in 1997, followed by additional entrants in
2004 and 2012.
Competition agencies often calculate the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measure of market concen-
tration. The HHI can be interpreted as an average market
share, ranging from slightly above zero for atomistic mar-
ket shares to 10,000 for a monopolist. Between 1,500 and
2,500 can be considered moderately concentrated (see for
example the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the U.S.
department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion [21]). Since insurance can be conceptualized as an
option to access provider markets that are typically local
or regional, insurance markets should be determined on a
local or regional level [22] .
Regional data are unavailable for Ireland. The national
HHI for Ireland’s insurance market in July 2011 was
approximately 0.442, suggesting quite little competition.
Indeed, profits for one insurer reportedly amounted to
17.3% of premiums in 2004 [23], and more recent anal-
ysis suggests persistent inefficiency and poor contracting
practices in one major insurer [24]. The number of insur-
ance products on the market increased from 18 in 2003 to
over 200 by 2012, and this may have facilitated widening
risk profiles between insurers [23]. There has been signif-
icant potential for insurers to compete on the basis of risk
selection rather than extracting value from providers (see
Section ‘Risk equalization’).
European competition law prohibits public subsidiza-
tion of an insurer in a competitive market [25]. The Irish
government initially aspired to design a system exempt
from European and national competition law [3], but
recently reversed this stance and stated that competition
law shall apply [19]. Ireland’s proposed system would
incorporate a public insurer, and if this occurs on a
‘level playing field’ without any special support for the
public insurer, this may have little bearing on dynam-
ics and incentives. But if risk-equalization is weak and
the government subsidizes the public insurer, it could
become burdened with costly patients (such as the chron-
ically ill) while private insurers risk-select more profitable
patients.
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In the Netherlands, the insurance market structure has
been dynamic since 2006, partly characterized by merg-
ers that increased HHI. The market is fairly concentrated,
and the national market shares of the four largest insurers
ranged from 13% to 33% in 2012. As shown in Figure 2,
if we consider a market with an HHI larger than 2,000
to be concentrated, all but one (South Holland) of the
provincial insurance markets are concentrated [26]. The
northern province of Friesland even has an HHI of above
7,000. However, since the products of the insurers are rel-
atively homogenous (with respect to the benefits package
and the underlying provider network), even a few firms
may engage in fierce competition. An indication of this
might be insurers’ annual loss of €600 million on the stan-
dard benefit package during the initial years after reform
[27]. Since 2009 insurers have made an annual profit on
the basic package. In particular, profits increased in 2012
because of cheaper purchasing of pharmaceuticals [28].
Determining the appropriate number of insurers poses
trade-offs. On the one hand, more insurers potentially
lead to greater price competition and better value for con-
sumers. As shown by a recent review [15], most evidence
comes from markets in the United States (US). One of the
more sophisticated analyses examined insurers’ ability to
price discriminate employers based on their profit level,
and although the analysis did not directly assess market
power, the findings suggest that markets with fewer than
seven insurance companies are not competitive [29]. The
Figure 2 An overview of the HHI per province in the
Netherlandse.
benefits package is not homogeneous in the US therefore
it is difficult to generalize this finding.
On the other hand, mergers between insurers may
enhance performance in multiple ways. First, a larger firm
may experience efficiencies of scale due to superior risk
pooling and spreading of administration costs. Second,
larger insurers may negotiate better prices from health
care providers. Dutch insurers have argued that mergers
were intended to boost negotiating power vis-a-vis hos-
pitals [30], supported by a negative correlation between
insurance market concentration and hospitals’ price-cost
margin [31]. This resonates with findings in other coun-
tries [32].
In the third instance, more competition between insur-
ers may give rise to underinvestment in quality, shown
empirically by Chernew et al. [33]. When a health insurer
invests in quality improvement, providers typically offer
the same quality to patients enrolled with rival insur-
ers. Consequently, despite its societal benefits, qual-
ity improvement may offer no market advantage over
rival insurers, which discourages investment by insurers.
Section ‘Transparency and consumer information’ exam-
ines incentives for clinical quality in more detail.
The hospital market
The number of hospitals influences the dynamics of
insurer-hospital negotiations, which in turn influences
hospital efficiency. For societal benefit, insurers should
be powerful enough to extract value from providers. This
power derives largely from the threat of selective contract-
ing, whereby insurers terminate a provider’s contracts in
favor of rival providers offering superior value [34]. Selec-
tive contracting may be less viable in Ireland than in
the Netherlands, and this could be a key challenge when
implementing managed competition.
Markets must contain sufficient providers to enable
insurers to contract selectively [4]. Although terminat-
ing contracts with a single hospital may have little direct
impact on insurance premiums, which depend on the
prices of many hospitals, it may enhance insurers’ nego-
tiating power by increasing the credibility of future
threats. Conversely, excluding a hospital could theoreti-
cally enhance the bargaining power of nearby hospitals by
dampening competition.
Despite its importance, selective contracting is
uncommon in the Netherlands [35]. Insurers generally
contract more than 95% of providers. Many insurers
backtracked from initial attempts at selective contracting,
due to concerns of reputational damage which could
prompt consumers to switch insurers [14]. Dutch cit-
izens have favoured retaining local hospital services
[36] and may mistrust insurers who restrict access.
Travel time may explain as much as 74% of hospital
choice in the Netherlands according to one study [37],
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although other studies suggest a more modest role (see
Section ‘Transparency and consumer information’).
Therefore consumers may not (yet) be willing to trade-off
local access for a smaller premium.
Dutch legislation forces insurers to contract with a
provider network offering certain services (mainly acute
care) within a specified distance of each enrollee’s res-
idence. This may further impede selective contracting,
creating an accessibility-efficiency trade-off. Moreover,
hospitals considered to be pivotal in regional service pro-
vision may receive some government protection from
bankruptcy, strengthening their market power [38]. As
an alternative to selective contracting, some Dutch insur-
ers have experimented with steering patients to preferred
providers using positive and negative financial incentives.
However the impact of this is unclear [14].
Even if insurers have the freedom to contract, the use of
selective contracting may be less viable in Ireland than in
the Netherlands. This is due to relative population density.
Population density is six times greater in the Netherlands
than Irelandf, and consequently Dutch hospitals tend to
be closer together than Irish hospitals [39], despite the
large size of Dutch hospitals by international standards.
The landmass of the Republic of Ireland is around 1.67
times that of the Netherlandsf, and contains 71 acute hos-
pitals (52 public and 19 private), compared to around
93 general hospital organizations and 198 independent
treatment centres (the latter providing non-acute surgical
interventions) in the Netherlands [40].
There are multiple academic teaching hospitals in
Dublin, Ireland’s capital city, but markets in the rest of
the country are more concentrated. This could give many
hospitals de facto local monopoly status. Where hospitals
are further apart, ceteris paribus, consumers could be less
willing to travel beyond a local hospital. An insurer who
contracts selectively may lose significant market share,
as enrollees may switch to a rival insurer offering local
services, and this weakens the credibility of the threat
of selective contracting. Robust quality information may
attenuate this problem, but this is not available.
Cultural norms may influence the ability of insurers to
terminate hospital contracts. Attempted closures of hos-
pitals in Ireland tend to be politically contentious and
have elicited public protest [41], suggesting that selec-
tive contracting may encounter resistance. A compari-
son of potentially relevant cultural norms in Ireland and
the Netherlands is beyond the scope of this debate. If
legislation forces Irish insurers to contract with a network
of providers that offers services within a specified distance
of enrollees’ residences, this would further hamper selec-
tive contracting, constituting an accessibility-efficiency
trade-off. Another potential barrier is a shortfall in hospi-
tal capacity [9,42]. But waiting lists may have dissipated to
an extent, and one report suggests that in November 2012
less than 500 people were waiting more than nine months
for inpatient treatments, compared to over 1,500 people
in December 2011 [43].
Empirically, there is evidence of a positive association
between the market shares of hospitals and the hospital
price cost margin in the Netherlands [31] and the US [32],
while evidence from other settings is limited. An analy-
sis of six hospital mergers in the Netherlands found price
increases for hip surgery of up to 16% [44]. In Ireland, if
counties are the relevant market, many hospital markets
are highly concentrated according to the HHIg (Figure 3).
By contrast, analysis of another parameter, the Logit Com-
petition Index (LOCI) [45], suggests that hospital markets
in Ireland are les concentrated than the Netherlands.
Figure 4 shows the LOCIs for the Netherlands and for
Irish public hospitals, where a higher LOCI signifies
greater competition, ceteris paribus. The Dutch data in
Figure 4 is based on unpublished observations from the
Dutch Healthcare Authority. Results are difficult to inter-
pret due to lack of data on Irish private hospitals, and as
capacity shortfalls may force patients to travel for services.
Competition may be limited even for some high volume
DRGs, as activity tends to be concentrated in a few Irish
hospitals.
To conclude, while in the Netherlands the insurance
market looks concentrated, the conclusion is that the
insurance market is relatively competitive [46]. The rea-
son is that in markets with homogeneous products (as
in the Netherlands) less market players are needed to
compete. The insurance market in Ireland is also con-
centrated. However, if a universal benefits package will
be adopted in Ireland, competition between insurers may
increase. Moreover, there are other potential benefits to
having a market with larger insurers, as they may be less
likely to under invest in quality and may negotiate bet-
ter prices. Our conclusion, based on the current working
of the Dutch system, is that the market structure of the
insurance market is not an obstacle for the introduction of
managed competition in Ireland.
The other requirement is a sufficient amount of
providers. The Dutch experience teaches us that in many
sectors (such as physiotherapy, speech therapy, pharma-
cies), there are sufficient providers. These providers have
claimed that insurers possess excessive monopsony power
[18]. We have focused on the hospital market, as this sec-
tor is responsible for most of the expenses of insurers.
The hospital market in the Netherlands is concentrated
as many firms have a market share of above 55%j. In
Ireland, the relatively large distances between hospitals
may inhibit insurers’ ability to contract selectively, and this
may be one of the less tractable problems facing man-
aged competition. Figure 5 presents the market shares
of hospitals in the Netherlands, based on unpublished
observations from the Dutch Healthcare Authority.
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Figure 3 The HHI per county in Irelandh.
Consumer choice of insurer
In managed competition, insurers compete for con-
tracts with consumers. To fulfill this condition consumers
should have a free choice of insurer without encounter-
ing high transaction costs. As Bevan and van de Ven [4]
conclude, consumers in the Netherlands have choice and
insurers are obliged to accept any consumer without price
discrimination.
Figure 4 The Loci in the Netherlands and Ireland based on data
2009i.
In the Netherlands, annual switching rates between
insurers fell from a peak of 20% in 2006 to around 3–
4% per year during 2008 and 2009, then increased to
8,3% in 2013 [28]. Some analysts interpret low rates
of switching as a lack of competition [17]. However,
low switching rates may also signify a competitive mar-
ket in which quality and efficiency are improving. It is
concerning that the elderly and chronically ill may be
deterred from switching, due to fears their new insurer
will not enroll them in voluntary supplementary health
insurance [4].
The Irish government stated that consumers will be per-
mitted to choose an insurer annually, and that insurers
will not be permitted to reject them (open enrollment).
In addition, consumers will be permitted to renew their
cover for the duration of their lifetime, and insurers can-
not price discriminate on the basis of age or morbidity
(community rating) [19]. However, the enforcement of
these objectives is dependent on the creation of sufficient
regulatory capacity, which we discuss in section ‘Market
regulation’. Cultural norms may also influence the degree
to which insurance companies adhere to these principles,
and the degree to which deviant behaviour by insurers is
tolerated, however a detailed discussion of cultural norms
is beyond the scope of this debate.
In sum, as Bevan and van de Ven [4] conclude, this
condition is fulfilled in the Netherlands. The Irish gov-
ernment aims explicitly to fulfill this condition from
the outset of managed competition. Section ‘Market
regula- tion’ describes the Irish plans to ensure an
appropriate regulatory framework is in place to achieve
this.
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Figure 5Market shares of hospitals in the Netherlands.
Financial incentives for efficiency
Managed competition seeks to achieve value by reduc-
ing waste in the delivery of care. In the Netherlands,
price growth in the liberalized (insurer negotiated) seg-
ment of hospital services has been slower than in the
price-regulated segment since 2006 [14], potentially due
to insurer competition and negotiating power. Increased
activity levels that resulted in shorter waiting lists, have
also counterbalanced any savings in unit costs.
If activity increases are meeting previously unmet need
in a cost-effective manner, this is a favorable outcome. But
the additional activity may reflect some supplier-induced
demand, a form of unnecessary treatment [47]. Unneces-
sary treatment may be widespread, due to the frequently
subjective nature of clinical need, and failure to match
care patterns with patients’ individualized preferences
[48].
Some insurers seek to temper volume growth by spec-
ifying volume caps in hospital negotiations, such as in
the form of lower prices beyond a certain volume thresh-
old. A weakness of the system, described by Bevan and
van de Ven [4], has been the complex, unwieldy classifi-
cation scheme on which hospital payment is based. This
comprised over 30,000 unique diagnosis treatment com-
binations, and although the scheme has been simplified it
remains a work in progress.
It is unclear whether managed competition is more
or less susceptible to wasteful spending than a single
payer framework. Looking at cost growth in OECD coun-
tries (Figure 6), it is not immediately apparent whether
countries with multiple payers perform better or worse
than single payer countries. For example the annual
growth rate of total expenditure on health in real terms
of the US is slightly lower than the OECD average, while
the annual growth in single payer countries like Australia,
Spain, Ireland and the UK is higher. On the other hand
the annual growth in single payer countries like France,
Norway and Sweden are lower than in the US.
Figure 7 shows the growth rate in hospital spending in
the Netherlands in the period before rate deregulation
(2001–2005) and after deregulation began (2006–2011).
The average annual growth rates between the two periods
are virtually indistinguishable
In Ireland, empirical analysis suggested that around 19%
of spending in hospitals is wasted due to operational inef-
ficiency. This analysis did not consider quality, and it
omitted potential savings from lower input prices and
from transfer of care to lower-cost settings such as pri-
mary care [49]. Inefficiency appears to be a contributing
factor to the lengthy waiting lists encountered for many
hospital services.
If managed competition is to mitigate this inefficiency
in Ireland, a robust system of contracting should instill
appropriate incentives. Currently, hospitals are predomi-
nantly paid by incremental budgeting related to historic
spending patterns, with modest activity based payment
adjustments [49]. Hospital efficiency is assessed for activ-
ity accounting for 80% of hospital budgets, yet payment
adjustments are a maximum of 3% of budgets [50,51].
A transition towards increased activity-based payment is
currently underway [52].
The efficiency of health care providers is a function
of financial and intrinsic incentives. In order to respond
optimally to financial incentives, providers must pos-
sess managerial expertise and a culture that facilitates
improvement. There has been limited systematic effort to
improve quality and efficiency in Irish care delivery, and
there is potentially scope to improve the cultural attitudes
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Figure 6 Cost growth in OECD countries, average annual growth of total expenditure on health in the period 2000–2010 or nearest year,
in real termsk.
of clinicians towards care redesign for efficiency and high
quality [10]. However, it is unclear how these cultural
factors in Ireland compare to the Netherlands.
The issue of efficiency is intimately linked to some other
preconditions. The power to contract selectively (freedom
to contract) and the number of providers both influence
insurers’ negotiating power, with direct implications for
efficiency. If the government proceeds to introduce price
caps on hospital services, this could also facilitate effi-
ciency. The rigour of risk equalization and regulation are
other key factors. Therefore these preconditions can be
viewed as mutually dependent, rather than as isolated
issues.
In sum, there is room to improve incentives for effi-
ciency in both countries. Yet deficient incentives would
also hamper the performance of a single payer system.
Therefore, this is not necessarily grounds to postpone the
introduction of managed competition, provided that its
cost control mechanisms are at least as effective as a single
payer system.
Figure 7 Average annual cost growth of hospitals andmedical specialists in the Netherlands, based on data from the Dutch Statistical
Bureau (CBS)l.
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Risk equalization
Managed competition attempts to align the interests of
insurers and patients. Ideally, insurance companies would
prosper by extracting value from providers, and con-
sumers’ choice of insurer would lead to an efficient allo-
cation of resources. However health insurance markets
are prone to information asymmetries, often leading to
market failure and efficiency losses [11]. Managed compe-
tition seeks to mitigate this problem.
Adverse selection refers to patients using private infor-
mation to gain advantage in insurance markets. It may
also refer to the use of private information by insurers
to gain advantage, which we address subsequently in the
paragraphs on risk selection. Consumers expecting high
health care costs often choose more expensive and gen-
erous plans, while those expecting low costs may prefer
cheaper plans. When this differential selection occurs
because price does not reflect an individual’s marginal
cost, this is adverse selection. An efficiency loss arises
because of the difference between price and cost [53].
Adverse selection results in some loss of desirable risk
spreading within plans, due to relatively healthy enrollees
opting out and sicker patients remaining enrolled. The
mean cost per enrollee increases in generous plans, and
sick people end up paying larger premiums than healthy
people. In its extreme form this results in unsustainable
price and cost increases, and the potential termination of
a plan, known as an “adverse selection death spiral” [53].
TheDutch and Irish insurance systems share some com-
mon strategies to mitigate information asymmetries. Each
system is based on open enrollment, meaning insurers
cannot refuse to insure anyone based on their health
risk. This weakens insurers’ ability to enroll profitable
consumers with a favorable risk profile or to prevent
enrollment of predictably lossmaking consumers risk-
select, collectively referred to as risk selection. However
in Ireland there are waiting periods for coverage in some
cases, such as after upgrading to a more generous plan.
Each insurance system is based on community rating,
whereby enrollees in a plan pay identical premiums irre-
spective of individual risk.
Community rating prevents price discrimination, but
simultaneously strengthens insurers’ incentives for risk-
selection. By contrast, under experience rating, insurers
would set individual premiums commensurate to individ-
ual risk [23].
The Dutch system mitigates concerns of adverse selec-
tion by standardizing the basic benefits package and
mandating insurance for each citizen. Therefore insurers
cannot strategically modify their basic offerings to attract
favorable risks. The Irish insurance market has been quite
vulnerable to adverse selection, firstly because insurers
must cover a minimum level of benefits rather than stan-
dardized benefits. Some policies offer reduced premiums
but restrict the benefits level for orthopaedic and oph-
thalmic procedures, which may attract younger enrollees
[54].
Secondly, premiums in Ireland are community rated
with limited cross-subsidization to reflect risk profile dif-
ferences. This cross-subsidization is known as risk adjust-
ment or risk equalization, and according to Bevan and van
de Ven [4] this is the first precondition for successful man-
aged competition. As Arrow [11] noted, in a ‘genuinely’
competitive market the only possible income redistribu-
tion by premiums is that which reflects differences in risk
profiles. Differential selection into Irish plans may have
contributed to annual price increases of up to 45% for
policies held mostly by older people. For a more detailed
discussion of community rating in Ireland, see Turner and
Shinnick [23].
The Dutch model uses sophisticated risk equalization
to dampen incentives for risk selection. Therefore insur-
ers offering high quality chronic disease management are
not penalized for attracting more expensive consumers
with multiple chronic diseases [55,56]. By contrast, risk
adjustment in the US has been limited, and one study
found that eight of ten plans understated the generosity of
their mental health benefits, reportedly to avoid attracting
loss-making risks [53].
In the Netherlands, an ex-ante (prospective) system
compensates insurers for actuarially predictable health
expenditure differentials induced by socio-demographic
and morbidity variables, such as age, sex, income, loca-
tion and prior health care consumption (chronic phar-
maceutical dependencies and prior hospitalization). This
levels the playing field and enables competition on
price and quality, rather than on risk profile. Until
2012 an ex-post (retrospective) risk-sharing scheme was
in place, and this accounted for an estimated 25%
of total risk-equalization payments in 2010 [14]. This
reduced incentives for risk selection, but also diluted
ex-ante incentives for vigorous price negotiations with
providers.
Risk-equalization is technically demanding. It need not
be ‘perfect’, but should be sophisticated enough to dis-
suade insurers from risk-selection. In the Netherlands
insurers can identify unprofitable patient subgroups, but
there is not yet evidence of negative risk-selection [56].
Among consumers who did not switch insurer during
2011, around 3% cited concern of being rejected for com-
plementary insurance as a reason [57]. There are concerns
that complementary health insurance and selective con-
tracting may serve as risk-selection tools [14].
Of note, the ex-ante system incentivizes insurers to
monitor the accuracy of risk equalization. Insurers employ
skilled econometricians to analyze expenditure patterns
and identify risk patterns that benefit rival insurers. If
a particular sub-population of enrollees is demonstrably
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under- (or over-) compensated, the system can be refined
to reflect this. This is a budget-neutral system there-
fore payments not distributed to one insurer are dis-
tributed to their rivals, strengthening incentives for vigi-
lant monitoring.
It is the ex-ante risk equalization that gives insurers
the incentive to seek efficiency in manage insurance and
the delivery of care through contracting [4]. Until 2012,
as part of the transition, some ex post compensation for
insurers was in place. The ex post mechanisms have been
largely abandoned in 2012.
In Ireland, risk-equalization has improved significantly
in recent years. Since January 2013 a new risk-equalization
algorithm accounts for age (over 60 years, in 5 year
bands), gender, the level of plan benefits, and overnight
hospital stays in a private or semi-private bed [3,58].
This follows a setback in 2008 when efforts to introduce
risk-equalization accounting for enrollee age, gender and
health status were deemed unconstitutional by a Supreme
Court ruling [54]. The Court interpreted legislation as
permitting community rating within plans but not across
multiple plans.
From 2009, a levy system partially compensated insur-
ers with a higher proportion of elderly patients [54].
Another measure was tax relief on a sliding scale for
older enrollees (over 60 years in 2011) to partly offset
the cost of higher premiums [23]. Tax relief compen-
sated for 65% of the higher costs of older enrollees in
2011, increased from 50% in 2009 and 2010. There-
fore incentives for risk-selection remained significant
[54]. Further improvements to the risk adjustment algo-
rithm will require rich socio-demographic and clinical
data. A national unique identifier number for patients
could facilitate data collection, and in 2013 the govern-
ment published legislation to create a legal basis for its
introduction [59]. Authorities are currently developing
information governance, technical and management stan-
dards to enable implementation of the unique identifier
[60].
In sum, the Dutch model demonstrates that robust risk
equalization may largely deter risk-selection. Matching
the strengths of this model would be vital for managed
competition in Ireland. This issue is linked to some other
preconditions: if risk-equalization is underdeveloped, this
may dampen the incentives for selective contracting and
efficiency. Despite significant strengthening of the Irish
risk equalization algorithm it remains inferior to the
Dutch model, and this should be further enhanced prior
to the introduction of managed competition.
Transparency and consumer information
Transparency is an important attribute of the benefits
package, the hospital payment mechanism, and qual-
ity of care. We discussed the payment mechanism for
hospitals in section ‘Financial incentives for efficiency’.
As regards the benefits package, the standardized pack-
age in the Netherlands is outlined in the Health Insurance
Act, although this does not apply to supplementary health
insurance packages. Each insurer must offer the basic
package to consumers. In Ireland the benefits package has
not been rigorously defined [61], but the government rec-
ognizes the importance of transparency and uniformity.
TheMinister for Health will determine the contents of the
benefits package, based on costed scenarios developed by
an advisory Commission which has yet to be established.
A portion of the benefits package will be provided by the
public health service outside of the universal health insur-
ance system [19]. The remainder of this section focuses
on transparency of clinical quality and on the incentives of
managed competition for quality improvement.
Choosing quality
High quality care is vital in any single or multiple payer
system. In the Netherlands, a retrospective chart review
suggested that around 1,700 hospitalized patients may
die from avoidable errors each year. An adverse event
occurred in 5.7% of all admissions to Dutch hospitals,
40% of which were considered preventable, and 12.8% of
which led to permanent disability or death. More than half
of adverse events related to surgery [62]. A more recent
analysis found that elderly patients are more likely than
younger patients to suffer an adverse event in hospital,
the consequences are likely to be more severe, and the
adverse events are more likely to arise from medication
error [63]. There appears to be unwarranted variation in
practice patterns across Dutch regions [64].
The research base in Ireland is scant, but we have lit-
tle grounds to believe outcomes are superior. Ireland’s
efforts to measure and improve quality are in their infancy
[65]. There are national systems to record adverse clini-
cal incidents and “hospital acquired diagnoses” in public
hospitals [66]. However there is no national registry for
tracking chronically ill patients, and relative to the United
Kingdom or the US there are few initiatives to reduce
the rate of clinical errors [10]. As noted in section‘Finan-
cial incentives for efficiency’, there may be scope to
improve cultural attitudes in Irish provider organizations
towards care redesign and quality improvement. How-
ever, it is unclear whether there are significant cultural
differences between clinical providers in Ireland and the
Netherlands.
It is not clear whether a single or multiple payer sys-
tem achieves better quality. Neither system can achieve
high quality in Ireland in the short term. An ideal
analysis would compare the likely trajectory of quality
under each system, however as an experimental compar-
ison is not feasible, we must base this on fragmented
evidence.
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By focusing on consumer choice, the pluralistic Dutch
institutional environment may have facilitated (or even
catalysed) increased performance measurement [14],
however it is difficult to isolate the impact of managed
competition from secular trends.
The Netherlands has the second highest number of
websites (eleven) of any country offering information on
health care quality [67], hospitals have been compelled to
report standardized quality indicators since 2009 [68], and
consumer surveys routinely assess satisfaction with insur-
ers and providers [14]. Average performance on themajor-
ity of hospital process and outcome indicators improved
over 2004 - 2008, although some clinical metrics deterio-
rated [68].
But incentives for Dutch insurers to aggressively
improve quality are quite weak. Among consumers who
switched insurers, around 52% were motivated by price
differentials, 4% cited the standard of insurer services, and
only 1% cited dissatisfaction with clinical quality in 2011
[57]. Moreover, a majority of patients base hospital choice
on physicians’ opinion [69,70], whereas only around 1.3%
used publicly available quality information [70]. One study
suggested that travel distance may explain 74% of hospital
choices [37], while others found that hospitals’ reputation
and travel distance are modestly important [69].
The scant influence of quality is perhaps unsurpris-
ingly given the quite crude nature of existing informa-
tion [40]. If quality reporting improves, insurers may
becomemore confident in restricting access to low quality
providers without disenfranchising consumers [30]. Yet
even when robust outcomes information is available, con-
sumers may be unable to rationally compare the quality
of care of each insurer. As most consumers are healthy
when selecting an insurer, they should weigh up the
probability of developing each disease with its associated
quality of care. This would probably be impractical and
unappealing. Conversely, consumers who are ill may base
their choice of insurer on quality indicators for a single
condition.
Of note, around 70% of Dutch consumers were insured
in group purchasing organizations in 2012. These collec-
tive contracts often select an insurer on behalf of con-
sumers. The implications for quality and efficiency are
unclear [57,71].
The increased emphasis on quality in the Netherlands
is to be welcomed. However performance measurement
is methodologically challenging and public performance
reporting may give rise to unintended consequences
such as patient selection by providers [72], data mis-
representation to improve perceived performance, and
prioritization of narrow, organization-specific objectives
to the detriment of wider health system goals [73].
Performance measurement in the Netherlands does not
adjust for patients’ underlying risk profile, and hospital
rankings exhibit marked variability [14]. Patients with co-
morbidities pose particular difficulties for performance
measurement, and around 37% of Dutch citizens over
55 years of age have two or more chronic illnesses [74].
Therefore caution is required.
Free-riding and prevention
A multi-payer environment creates some peculiar disin-
centives for quality improvement, one of which is free-
riding by insurers on each other’s quality investments
[75,76]. If a Dutch insurer invests in improving hospi-
tal quality, hospitals will probably offer the same quality
standards to consumers enrolled with other insurance
companies. This enhances equity [36], but may weaken
insurers’ incentives for quality improvement.
Consider the prevention of central line associated
bloodstream infections. Prevention is possible by imple-
menting a simple 5 item checklist, and while data are
limited for the Netherlands, we know that prevention
could avert up to 20,000 fatalities in US hospitals each year
while lowering costs by $2 Billion. Free-riding appears to
have deterred insurers from investing in preventive strate-
gies [77]. At its worst, free-riding can cause a ‘race to
the bottom’ with negligible efforts by insurers to improve
quality [75]. In theory, authorities might circumvent
free-riding by publishing robust performance informa-
tion for disease- and intervention-specific patient cohorts.
This could inform patient choice and spur improvement,
because even if insurers are not differentiated by quality,
hospitals could have strong incentives for quality to attract
patients.
For historical reasons the Dutch insurance system may
not be very susceptible to free-riding. Each regional
market tends to be dominated by a single insurer,
with one insurer typically contracting around 60–70%
of a hospital’s activity [31]. This is a legacy of many
insurers’ former status as sickness funds operating as
local monopolies. In Ireland, the structure of local
insurance markets would influence the extent of this
problem.
The original proposals for managed competition were
based on vertical integration between insurers and
providers [78]. This mitigates the free-riding problem,
as investments in quality are unlikely to benefit rival
insurance companies. There is scant evidence of vertical
integration’s effects on market power, but it may harm
competition by restricting rivals’ access to key inputs
[32]. Sparsely populated areas probably have too few
providers for vertical integration by all insurers [79]. In
the Netherlands, vertical integration has been rare, and
one insurer (Menzis) that owns or pays for some primary
care facilities permits their use by non-enrollees [30]. The
Dutch Parliament has considered prohibiting integration
between hospitals and insurers.
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Another perverse incentive relates to preventive care.
Evidence on the cost-effectiveness of preventive care is
mixed, but some interventions such as smoking cessation
may improve wellbeing and curtail expenditure. Managed
competition may instill quite weak incentives for preven-
tion of illness, because of the lag between preventive care
and the actual prevention of illness. Enrollees may switch
to a rival insurer during this lag, allowing a rival insurer
to reap the return on investment. The extent of this prob-
lem depends on the turnover rate and the characteristics
of enrolees who switch. In general, younger and healthier
enrollees are most likely to switch [80,81].
Risk adjustment also exerts perverse effects on pre-
ventive care. In the absence of risk adjustment, insurers
may incur predictable losses from chronically ill patients,
which can create a business case for investing in preven-
tion. But risk adjustment, by compensating insurers for
the incremental cost of chronically ill patients, dampens
incentives for prevention [82].
To conclude, achieving high quality is problematic in
both single and multiple payer systems. A multiple payer
environment may facilitate performance measurement
and reporting, but poses distinctive problems such as
free-riding. The superior lever for quality improvement in
Ireland is unclear. Although the disincentives of managed
competition for quality improvement are concerning, they
are not necessarily grounds to postpone the introduction
of managed competition.
Therefore, at present the precondition of a transparent
benefits package is not fulfilled in Ireland, and moreover
the institutional arrangements to accomplish this are not
yet in place.
Market regulation
The health system is susceptible to numerous market
failures. Therefore, according to Bevan and van de Ven
[4] any country needs to have four authorities situated
at arm’s length from the government to address spe-
cific market failures. They mention the Dutch context
where a quality authority seeks to protect consumers
against “substandard quality of care”, a financial regulator
is present to safeguard the solvency of insurers, alongside
a competition authority and a sector specific competition
authority/regulatorm.
In Ireland, by contrast, the institutional framework for
managed competition is less developed. Some necessary
institutions are in operation but their capacity to regulate
a system of universal health insurance is unclear. Other
key institutions have yet to be established.
According to government documents, a National Insur-
ance Fund will be established to assess consumers’ enti-
tlement to financial support when purchasing a premium,
and to administer support payments directly to each
insurer on behalf of consumers. Novel processes shall
also be created for the resolution of contractual disputes
between insurers and providers. Ireland has an established
competition authority, but not a sector-specific healthcare
competition authority. The body responsible for regulat-
ing the health insurance market is the Health Insurance
Authority, which has been in operation since 2001 [19].
A key body is the Health Information and Quality
Authority (HIQA), established in 2007 with the mandate
of enhancing the quality of health and social services.
Its statutory responsibilities include creating and enforc-
ing standards for quality, conducting health technology
assessments, and publishing performance information.
In managed competition, HIQA would be responsible
for adjudicating on disputes between purchasers and
providers or members of the public, where there is dis-
agreement regarding the interpretation of the contents of
the benefits package. It will also assess the value of clin-
ical interventions so as to inform decisions relating to
the composition of the package. It is proposed to cre-
ate a Patient Safety Agency to advocate for patients who
wish to make complaints about care quality, which will
complement the work of HIQA [19].
In sum, despite the presence of significant regulatory
capacity, this precondition is not fulfilled in Ireland. Exist-
ing institutions can contribute to key regulatory tasks,
but would appear to require significant bolstering of their
institutional capacity, and the creation and development
of new institutions will take time.
Summary
The Netherlands, whose journey towards managed com-
petition began over two decades ago, appears to possess
most preconditions for effective implementation. There
are concerns such as the degree of concentration in the
provider market and a lack of transparency about qual-
ity, and on balance it is too early to judge the success of
the 2006 reform. But the conditions for managed compe-
tition appear more auspicious in the Netherlands than in
Ireland.
In its favor, although the existing Irish supplementary
health insurance market does not appear highly com-
petitive, there may be enough insurers to compete on a
homogeneous product (the standardized benefits pack-
age). Vigilant antitrust may be needed to prevent excessive
concentration of the insurance market. The limitations of
the Irish risk equalization system could be resolved over
time, provided that sufficient data and technical expertise
are available.
It is crucial to develop robust performance measure-
ment and to nurture a culture of clinical improvement,
irrespective of the number of payers. The Dutch pri-
mary care sector is largely shielded from competitive
forces, but appears to offer high quality at low cost
[83], illustrating the importance of clinician leadership.
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A review of international evidence found that compe-
tition between hospitals appears to improve quality in
markets with administered prices, but the evidence is
unclear in pluralistic insurance markets [32]. It is not clear
whether a single or multiple payer system would achieve
superior quality. Although the Dutch reform is associ-
ated with perverse incentives for quality improvement
(section ‘Transparency and consumer information’), this
is not necessarily an impediment to reform.
A fundamental problem may be a lack of competition
between Irish hospitals, due to their relatively sparse geo-
graphic distribution, which could weaken insurers’ ability
to prudently purchase care. Insurers in the Netherlands
have succeeded in reducing the prices of generic pharma-
ceuticals [47], but have not lowered significantly the aver-
age annual cost increase. This is a key dichotomy. When
negotiating against stakeholders such as the generic phar-
maceutical industry, insurers can extract value through
“take it or leave it” offers. Consumers typically are
not loyal to generic pharmaceutical companies, and are
unlikely to leave their insurance company if they cannot
receive medicines from a specific manufacturer. By con-
trast, consumers’ preference for local hospital services can
weaken insurers. Therefore, this divergent cost trajectory
for generic pharmaceuticals and hospitals is a predictable
effect of market structure. The Irish government appears
cognizant of this risk, and proposes the introduction of
price caps to mitigate excessive hospital market power.
To summarize, the essential preconditions for managed
competition are not yet in place in Ireland, and the reform
would require a lengthy transition period with uncertain
benefits. But a single payer model, the alternative, is also
incapable of optimizing quality and efficiency in the short
term.
Key next steps are to develop more robust contracting
mechanisms and risk equalization, a legal and tech-
nical framework for price caps, and increased auton-
omy of public hospitals to allow them to retain bud-
get surpluses and thereby strengthen incentives for
efficiency [49]. Additional regulatory capacity will be
needed, as well as efficiency gains to alleviate under-
supply of services. The Irish government should exhibit
patience, and refrain from introducing managed competi-
tion until sufficient preconditions are in place for effective
performance.
Endnotes
aLong-term care (e.g. nursing homes), and all those
treatments and services that cannot be insured
individually because such expenses would be too high to
bear, notably mental illness requiring prolonged nursing
and care, and congenital physical or mental handicap are
separately insured under a mandatory one-tier system.
bIncreased from 220 Euro to 350 Euro in 2013.
cDeductible: A sum, fixed or variable, specified in an
insurance policy, that is deducted from any claim made
under that policy; that sum is then paid by the beneficiary,
the remainder being paid by the insurer, subject to any
co-payment, user charge or co-insurance arrangement.
(?. Copay- ment: A form of medical cost sharing in a
health insurance plan that requires an insured person to
pay a fixed dollar amount when a medical service is
received. The insurer is responsible for the rest of the
reimbursement. Some plans require that a deductible
first be met for some specific services before a copayment
applies (Interdepartmental Committee on Employment-
based Health Insurance Surveys 2002). Interdepartmental
Committee on Employment-based Health Insurance
Surveys 2002). Definitions of Health Insurance Terms.
Washington D.C., Bureau of Labour Statistics. Roberts, J.
L. 1998). A glossary of technical terms on the economics
and finance of health services. Copenhagen, World
Health Organization Regional Office for Europe.
dHowever there are many court cases and a political
debate about the reimbursement if patients go to
providers outside the contracted network.
eFigure based on [26].
fUnited Nations Population Division http://esa.un.org/
unpp.
gIn Figure 3 unconcentrated markets are shown in
green, moderately concentrated markets are shown in
orange and highly concentrated markets are represented
in red.
hSource: The Economic and Social Research Institute.
Hospital Inpatient Enquiry Scheme database. http://www.
esri.ie (2013).
iSource: The Economic and Social Research Institute.
Hospital Inpatient Enquiry Scheme database. http://www.
esri.ie (2013).
jThe Dutch law states it is plausible that hospitals with
a market share with a market share above 40% have mar-
ket power. Hospitals with a market share above 55% are
assumed to have market power.
kOrganisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment. (2013). “OECD Health Data 2013.” Retrieved
Accessed on 5th April 2014, from http://www.oecd.org/
health/health-systems/oecdhealthdata.htm (2013).
lBased on data from CBS (Statistics Netherlands),
http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/dome/?LA=nl.
mFor a more detailed description of the application of
competition rules in the healthcare sector, see the follow-
ing book chapter by Sauter [84].
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